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Abstract 
 
This study derives a reduced-form equation for the aggregate supply curve from a model in 
which firms pay efficiency wages and workers have imperfect information about average 
wages at other firms. If specific assumptions are made about workers’ expectations of 
average wages and about aggregate demand, the model predicts how the aggregate demand 
and supply curves shift and how output and prices adjust in response to demand shocks and 
supply shocks. The model also provides an alternative explanation for Lucas’ (1973) finding 
that the AS curve is steeper in countries with greater inflation variability.        
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An Efficiency Wage – Imperfect Information Model of the Aggregate Supply Curve 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 The aggregate demand (AD) – aggregate supply (AS) framework has been developed 
to analyze the effects of demand shocks and supply shocks on output and the price level. 
The aggregate supply curve is generally assumed to be upward sloping in the short run and 
vertical in the long run.1 Explanations for an upward-sloping short-run AS curve include 
imperfect information about the price level, sticky prices, and rigid nominal wages. 
 This study takes a different approach and derives an aggregate supply curve from an 
efficiency wage model in which workers have imperfect information about average wages. 
The profit-maximization problem of firms yields a reduced-form equation that relates the 
difference between actual output and potential output to technology shocks, input price (e.g., 
oil) shocks, wages, workers’ expectations of average wages, and the price level. Under 
reasonable conditions, the coefficient on the price level is positive, which means that the 
economy is characterized by an upward-sloping short-run AS curve. The value of this 
coefficient (and thus the slope of the AS curve) depends on the model’s microeconomic 
parameters. In addition, the model provides an alternative explanation for Lucas’ (1973) 
finding that the AS curve is steeper in countries in which inflation is more variable. 
Section II reviews previous work on the aggregate supply curve and discusses 
undesirable features of various models. In addition, it is shown that a common specification 
for the AS curve implies that adverse supply shocks are likely to lower unemployment. It is 
argued that the model in the present study is based on a more realistic set of assumptions 
than previous models and that its predictions are more in line with the behavior of the 
economy.  
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In Section III, an expression for the aggregate supply curve is derived under the 
assumptions that firms pay efficiency wages and that workers have imperfect information 
about average wages at other firms. Then, in Section IV specific assumptions are made 
about aggregate demand and workers’ expectations of average wages. With these 
assumptions, the model predicts how the AD and AS curves shift over time in response to 
demand shocks, technology shocks, and input price shocks, yielding expressions for the 
paths that output and prices follow over time in response to these shocks. As expected, 
output and prices initially rise when aggregate demand increases, but output eventually 
returns to potential output as the aggregate supply curve shifts. In the transition between the 
economy’s initial equilibrium and new equilibrium, real wages can be procyclical, acyclical, 
or countercyclical, depending on the model’s parameters. In response to technology and 
input price shocks, both the long-run and short-run AS curves shift, and it is theoretically 
ambiguous whether the change in short-run output is greater or less than the change in long-
run output. However, under reasonable conditions, supply shocks affect short-run output 
more than they affect long-run output, which means that adverse supply shocks initially 
raise unemployment and favorable supply shocks initially lower it. In the long run, 
unemployment returns to its initial value. 
Section V provides another explanation for Lucas’ (1973) finding that the AS curve 
is steeper in countries with greater inflation variability. In Section VI the model is 
generalized to make efficiency a function of the ratio between a worker’s actual wage and 
his or her reference wage, and it is argued that this modification enables the model to 
explain a wider set of phenomena. A brief conclusion is provided in Section VII. 
 3
II. Relation to Previous Literature 
Economists have developed several explanations for an upward-sloping aggregate 
supply curve. In Lucas (1973) firms observe their own price but do not observe the 
aggregate price level, and they view changes in their own price as partly general and partly 
idiosyncratic. When the overall price level rises, each firm views this rise as partly 
idiosyncratic and raises output accordingly, so that a higher price level is associated with 
higher aggregate output. A second explanation for an upward-sloping AS curve is that prices 
are sticky because firms adjust prices infrequently and these adjustments are not 
synchronized, as in Rotemberg (1982) and Calvo (1983). When aggregate demand rises, 
prices adjust slowly to their new equilibrium values, resulting in an increase in output and a 
positive association between the price level and real GDP. A third reason for this positive 
relationship is the sticky nominal wage model of Keynes (1936), in which a rise in the price 
level reduces the real wage and induces firms to increase employment and output.  
A common specification for the AS curve is )( ettt PPYY −+= α , where Yt is actual 
output, Y is full-employment output, Pt is the actual price level, is the expected price 
level, and α is the slope of the AS curve. In fact, Mankiw (2007) demonstrates that an 
equation of this form can be derived from all three of the previously discussed models. 
e
tP
However, there are shortcomings with each of these models and with the 
specification )( ettt PPYY −+= α . The imperfect information model of Lucas (1973) 
attributes output fluctuations to firms’ lack timely information about the aggregate price 
level. In reality, however, data on the price level are published monthly by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics and are readily available on the internet. Given the ease of accessing these 
statistics, it is not obvious why imperfect information about the price level could cause large 
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fluctuations in output. In addition, Lucas does not consider the labor market, which means 
that his model does not provide a rationale for unemployment and does not treat output as 
being determined from a production function involving labor input. Furthermore, aggregate 
supply shocks are not considered in Lucas’ model.  
Models with sticky prices (e.g. Calvo (1983) and Rotemberg (1982)) explain why 
prices are sticky and why decreases in demand reduce output. However, while the price 
level is sticky in these model, the inflation rate can adjust quickly to shocks, so 
disinflationary demand shocks do not necessarily lower output. In fact, Ball (1994) 
demonstrates that the sticky price model predicts that announced, credible disinflations may 
actually raise output. In addition, Fuhrer and Moore (1995) show that the sticky price model 
cannot explain the persistence of inflation observed in U.S. data.2  
In addition, the sticky price models of Calvo (1983) and Rotemberg (1982) do not 
consider involuntary unemployment. Calvo’s model does not incorporate a labor market and 
assumes that firms produce output at zero variable cost up to a certain level, so that supply is 
demand-determined up to this level. In one version of Rotemberg’s model, production is a 
function of labor, but the labor market is assumed to be competitive so there is no 
involuntary unemployment.3 Also, Calvo’s and Rotemberg’s models consider only demand 
shocks and do not analyze the response of the economy to aggregate supply shocks.    
 A criticism of the sticky wage model of Keynes (1936) is its predictions concerning 
the cyclical behavior of real wages. As discussed in Romer (2006) and Mankiw (2007), this 
model predicts that real wages should be countercyclical. However, when Bils (1985) and 
Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) analyze the behavior of real wages with individual data, 
they find that real wages are significantly procyclical. Another version of the sticky nominal 
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wage model is Taylor (1979), in which overlapping contracts result in slow adjustment of 
nominal wages. In this model, the behavior of the price level and the supply of labor are not 
considered. Because labor supply is not modeled, it is not clear whether the slow adjustment 
of wages results in involuntary unemployment. 
As previously discussed, Mankiw (2007) demonstrates that all three of these models 
yield the specification, )( ettt PPYY −+= α . However, this specification implies that 
adverse supply shocks are likely to lower unemployment. Suppose that an adverse supply 
shock raises the price level. If price expectations do not fully adjust (i.e.,  rises less than 
), then Yt initially exceeds the new value of  
e
tP
tP Y , meaning that unemployment is initially 
below the natural rate. Even if  increases as much as , output will equal the new value 
of 
e
tP tP
Y , implying that unemployment will not rise. Adverse supply shocks would raise 
unemployment only if  rises more than , which would appear to imply irrationality on 
the part of workers. However, historical evidence suggests that adverse supply shocks do 
tend to raise unemployment. For example, unemployment rose significantly following large 
increases in oil prices in 1973-74 and 1979-80. 
e
tP tP
 The present study takes a different approach in modeling aggregate supply. It is 
assumed that workers’ efficiency depends on their relative wages (because of the effect of 
relative wages on workers’ effort and quit propensities) and that workers have imperfect 
information about average wages.4 These assumptions are then used to derive a closed-form 
equation for the aggregate supply curve. This approach provides a framework for analyzing 
both demand shocks and supply shocks. It is argued below that a model with efficiency 
wages and imperfect information is based on a more realistic set of assumptions than 
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previous models of aggregate supply and that its predictions appear to be more in line with 
observed macroeconomic data. 
In terms of assumptions, this model incorporates a labor market in which labor is an 
input in the production function and in which there is involuntary unemployment. Unlike in 
models involving overlapping contracts, firms in the efficiency wage – imperfect 
information model are free to set wages and prices each period. While firms can set wages 
and prices each period, they find it optimal to adjust wages and prices slowly to their new 
equilibrium level in response to aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks.  
The efficiency wage – imperfect information model differs from the imperfect 
information model in that the former assumes that workers have imperfect information about 
average wages, while the latter assumes that firms have imperfect information about the 
aggregate price level. The assumption that workers have imperfect information about 
average wages seems to be more realistic than the assumption that firms have imperfect 
information about the price level. The variable that affects firms’ output in Lucas (1973) is 
the aggregate price level, and this variable is published monthly and is available on the 
internet. In contrast, the variable that matters for a worker’s effort and quit decisions is the 
average wage for workers with similar characteristics (e.g., age, experience, and education) 
in the same narrowly defined occupational group, and this type of data is not easily 
obtainable.5 Also, the profits of the typical firm are much higher than the wages of a typical 
worker, so the cost of incorrect expectations is probably much greater for firms than for 
workers,6 giving workers less incentive than firms to acquire the relevant information. In 
fact, employers in Bewley’s (1999) survey believed that their workers did not have a very 
precise idea of wages at other firms. Thus, it seems more reasonable to construct a theory on 
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the assumption that workers have imperfect information about average wages than on the 
assumption that firms have imperfect information about the price level.   
Relative to other models of aggregate supply, the efficiency wage – imperfect 
information model appears to make more reasonable predictions about macroeconomic 
variables. First, unlike aggregate supply models in which )( ettt PPYY −+= α , the 
efficiency wage – imperfect information model predicts that, given realistic parameter 
values, adverse supply shocks will initially raise unemployment. Second, the efficiency 
wage – imperfect information model predicts that real wages can be procyclical, acyclical, 
or countercyclical, depending on the model’s parameters. In contrast, the real wage is 
countercyclical in the sticky wage model of Keynes (1936), contrary to empirical evidence.  
 The models that are most similar to the efficiency wage – imperfect information 
model are Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Blanchard (2003). In Mankiw and Reis’ “sticky 
information” model, each period a fraction of firms receives information that enables them 
to compute optimal prices for their products; the other firms set prices based on out-of-date 
information. The present study differs from Mankiw and Reis in two respects. First, Mankiw 
and Reis’ model does not incorporate a labor market, so involuntary unemployment is not 
considered. Second, the informational imperfection is firms’ expectations of optimal prices 
(which depend on the price level and aggregate output) in Mankiw and Reis, and is workers’ 
expectations of average wages in the present model. Since data on the price level and GDP 
are easily available, it is not obvious why some firms would operate with out-of-date 
information. On the other hand, as previously discussed, there are good reasons why 
workers may have imperfect information about the relevant average wage.  
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Blanchard (2003) assumes a wage-setting relationship of the form, , 
where u is the unemployment rate and z represents other variables that may affect the wage-
setting process. While Blanchard states that this type of wage-setting relationship can be 
obtained from either a bargaining model or an efficiency wage model, either of these 
theories would predict that wages should depend on workers’ expectations of average wages 
rather than on their expectations of the price level. Also, Blanchard assumes a constant 
markup of wages over prices, while the present study assumes the markup is endogenously 
determined and allows it to vary over the business cycle. 
),( zuFPW e=
 
III. A Model of the Aggregate Supply Curve 
 
 In deriving the AS curve, the following assumptions are made:  
1. Workers’ efficiency (e) depends on the ratio of their current wage to their expectations 
of wages at other firms and on the unemployment rate, so that  
 
0  and,0,0,0with],,/[ <<>>= WWWuuWtett eeeeuWWee , 7     
 
 
where Wt is a worker’s current wage,  etW  denotes workers’ expectations of the average 
wage rate, and ut is the unemployment rate.8 Explanations for why efficiency may 
depend positively on wages and unemployment include the shirking model of Shapiro 
and Stiglitz (1984); the gift-exchange/fair wage models of Akerlof (1982, 1984) and 
Akerlof and Yellen (1990); the labor turnover models of Stiglitz (1974), Schlicht (1978), 
and Salop (1979); and the adverse selection model of Weiss (1980). The function 
],/[ t
e
tt uWWe  can be viewed as incorporating all of these explanations. 
 
2. Each firm produces output (Y) with the production function,  
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 φβφβφφ ],/[1 t
e
ttttttt uWWeKILAY
−−= , 
 
 
where A represents technology (assumed to be labor augmenting), L is labor input, I  is 
an input in the production process (e.g., oil), K is the capital stock, and e is defined 
above. It is assumed that the capital stock is exogenously determined. 
 
3. The demand curve facing an individual firm can be expressed as 
 
 
γ
θ
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
t
tD
t P
PY , 
 
where θ represents real demand, P is the firm’s price, P  is the aggregate price level, and 
γ is the price elasticity of demand. Thus, the firm’s price is 
 
tttt PQP
γγθ
11 −= ,   
 
and its total revenue is  
 
  ttttt PQQP
γ
γ
γθ
11 −
= .  
 
 
 
4. Labor supply is inelastic and equals N times the number of firms. Parameters are chosen 
so that there is excess supply of labor.9 Since parameters are chosen so that firms 
maximize profits by paying efficiency wages, wages and employment are determined by 
differentiating the profit function with respect to both W and L.     
 
Given these assumptions, profits in period t can be expressed as 
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(1) [ ] ,)(],/[ 111 ttttttttetttttttt IPzKiLWPuWWeKILA −+−−=Π −−− δθ γγφβφβφφγ  
 
where i is the interest rate, δ is the depreciation rate, and z is the real price of the input. 
In deriving the aggregate supply curve, we first obtain expressions for the profit 
function and production function that include the price of the input rather than the quantity 
of the input. The optimal amount of the input is determined from the condition,  
 
 tttttttt
t
t PzPeKILA
dI
d −•−==Π
−−−−−−−− γ
γφ
γ
γβφ
γ
γβ
γ
γφ
γ
γφ
γθγ
γβ )1()1)(1(1)1()1()1(1 ][)1(0 . 
 
 
Solving the above equation for It yields 
 )1(
)1(
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γβγ
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γβγ
γβφ
γβγ
γφ
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γφ
γβγγβγ
γ
θγβ
γ
tttttt zeKLAI . 
 
 
As demonstrated in Appendix A, if this expression for I is substituted into equation (1), 
profits can be expressed as 
 
(2) 
.)(
)1(
)1(
)1(
],/[
)1(
)1(
)1(
)1(
)1(
)1(
)1)(1(
)1(
)1(
)1(
)1(
)1(
1
ttt
ttt
e
ttttttt
KiLW
zPuWWeKLA
+−−−
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⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−×
=Π
−−−
−−
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−
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−−−
−−
−
−−
−
−−
δγβ
γβγ
γβ
γ
θ
γβγ
γ
γβγ
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γβγ
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γβφ
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 In addition, substituting this expression for I into the production function yields the 
following equation for output: 
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This expression for Yt can be simplified by noting that .t
D
tt YY ==θ 10  This 
substitution enables the production function to be expressed as   
 
(3)  β
β
β
φ
β
βφβ
β
β
φ
β
φ
γβ
γ −−−−−−−−−− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−=
111
1
1
11 ],/[
)1( tt
e
tttttt zuWWeKLAY . 
 
 
 The first-order conditions are obtained by differentiating (2) with respect to L and W. 
One first-order condition is            
 
.
)1(
)1(
)1(
],/[
)1(
)1(0
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Solving this equation for Lt yields the following equation for labor demand: 
 
(4) 
 .
)1(
],/[
)1)((
)1)((
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)1)(1(
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The other first-order condition is 
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Substituting (4) into (5) yields 
 
(6) 1 1],/[],/[ 1 =− e
t
t
e
ttWt
e
ttt W
uWWeuWWeW , 
 
which is analogous to the Solow (1979) condition.11  
The economy’s long-run aggregate supply curve is obtained from setting t
e
t WW =  in 
(6). Thus, in equilibrium the following condition must be satisfied: 
 
(7) . 1 ],1[],1[ 1 =− tWt ueue
 
This condition determines the economy’s equilibrium unemployment rate (i.e., the 
natural rate of unemployment). If u* represents the value of u that solves (7), the long-run 
AS curve can be expressed as 
 
(8) β
β
β
φ
β
βφβ
β
β
φ
β
φ
γβ
γ −−−−−−−−−− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−=
111
1
1
11 *],1[
)1(
*)]1([ zueKuNAY . 
 
An equation for the short-run AS curve can be derived by substituting the labor 
demand equation into the production function. However, equation (4) is not a closed-form 
solution for labor demand, since ut (which depends on Lt)  is a variable on the right-hand 
side. However, a closed-form solution for labor demand can be obtained by expressing 
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variables as deviations from steady-state values. Differentiating (4) and dividing by the 
original equation yields the following relationship:  
 
(9) 
,ˆ
)1)((
)1(ˆ
))1)((
)1(
]ˆˆ[
)1)((
)1(ˆ
)1)((
)1)(1(
ˆ
))1)((
)1(ˆ
)1)((
1ˆ
)1)((
)1(ˆ
1
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e
tWtWt
tttt
zP
dueWeWeeK
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γγβφ
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γβφ
γγβφ
γφθγγβφγγβφ
γβγ
−−+
−+−−+
−−−
+−−−+
−−−−+
−−−−
−−+
−−−−+−−−+
−−=
−  
 
where variables with “^’s” over them represent percentage deviations. This equation can be 
viewed as representing deviations (the absolute deviation in u and the percentage deviations 
in the other variables) from their steady-state values. If small deviations of these variables 
from their steady-state values are considered, the coefficients on these variables can be 
treated as constants, with these constants determined by steady-state values of e, eW, and eu.  
The value of dut in (9) can be expressed as a function of . The fourth assumption 
implies that  
tLˆ
 
 
N
LN
u tt
−= . 
 
Letting  (where is the equilibrium value of ), can be approximated by  NLsL /
∗= ∗L L tdu
 
 .ˆ
)/( tLL
tt
t LssL
dL
N
dL
du −≈−=−= ∗  
 
Substituting  and  (from (7)) into (9) yields the following equation for 
: 
tLt Lsdu ˆ−= 11 =− Wee
tLˆ
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(10) 
,ˆ)1(ˆ)1(ˆ)1(
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KAWL
η
γβ
η
γβγ
η
γφ
η
γβφ
η
γφθηη
γγβφ
−−−−+−−
−−−+−++−−+=
 
 
 
  where    . ])[1( 1 Lu see
−−+−−= φβφγγη
 
 
It will be assumed that the overall effect of a rise in employment is to increase output (i.e., 
the direct effect of employment on output outweighs the fact that a rise in employment 
reduces unemployment, which decreases workers’ efficiency), which implies that 
. Given this assumption, η>0.  01 1 >− − Lu see
Differentiating the production function (3) and dividing by the original equation 
yields 
 
(11) .ˆ
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1
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This equation expresses deviations in output from its steady-state value as a function of 
deviations in other variables. Appendix A demonstrates that substituting equation (10) and 
the relationships tt Y=θ , dut= , and  into (11) yields the following equation 
for the short-run AS curve:  
tL Ls ˆ− 11 =− Wee
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Given the assumption that , the AS curve is upward sloping since an 
increase in the price level is as  in output. In this equation, the coefficient 
on 
01 1 >− − Lu see
sociated with a rise
tPˆ  is the slope of the AS curve (holding current wages constant), and the coefficients on 
 and  show how the AS curve shifts in response to supply shocks.  
An equivalent specification for the AS curve is 
 
(13) 
tAˆ tzˆ
).ˆˆ(
)1(1
)1(
)ˆˆ(
)1(1
ˆ
)1(1
ˆ
)1(1
1ˆ
)1(1
ˆ
1
1
1
111
tt
Lu
Lue
tt
Lu
t
Lu
t
Lu
t
Lu
t
PW
see
seeWW
see
z
see
K
see
A
see
Y
−−−−
−−−−−−+
−−−−−−−
−−+−−−=
−
−
−
−−−
φβ
φ
φβ
φ
φβ
β
φβ
βφ
φβ
φ
 
 
 (13), output depends positively on the difference between the actual and expected 
nominal wage and depends negatively on the real wage, implying that the aggregate supply 
relationship can be explained both by theories emphasizing misperceptions and by theories 
emphasizing the role of real wages on employment.   
 
IV. The Dynamics of Price and Output Adjustment 
 
AS curve from microeconomic 
principles, but it does not predict the paths followed by output and prices in response to 
shocks. However, expressions for these paths can be derived if functional forms are 
specified for wage expectations (
In
12
 
 The previous section derives an equation for the 
e
tW ) and for demand (θ). In this section specific 
assumptions are made about these variables, enabling the dynamics of the economy’s 
adjustment to demand and supply shocks to be analyzed. In modeling wage expectations, it 
is assumed that expectations are a weighted average of rational and adaptive expectations, as 
in Campbell (2008). In particular, it is assumed that  
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(14) 1)1( −−+= ttt WWW ωω ,  ˆˆˆ e
ω represents the degree to which expectations are rational. Campbell (2008) discusses 
previous studies that find that expectations are neither completely rational nor complete 
teady-states, they can be expressed as 
IS:  ,              and  
 
 
where 
adaptive. Because the AD-AS framework is generally expressed in terms of levels, the 
adaptive component of workers’ expectations is lagged average wages. The end of this 
section discusses the implications of assuming that the adaptive expectations component is a 
function of lagged wage changes.  
Demand is assumed to be described by an IS-LM specification. If the IS and LM 
curves are linearized around their s
 
ttt 21 iaEaY ˆˆˆ −=
 
tib ˆ) 2+ , LM: ttt PMbY ˆˆ(ˆ 1 −=
 
 
where  is nominal demand, E represents autonomous real expenditures, and i represents 
e interest rate. Eliminating the interest rate yields 
M
th
 
 tttt Eba
P
ba
M
ba
Y ˆˆˆˆ
22
12
22
21
22
21
+++−+=
ababab . 
ccordingly, the price level can be expressed as 
 
 
 
A
 
(15) tttt EYMP ψκ +−= , ˆˆˆ
here  
 
w
 
 
 17
21
12
21
22 ,
ab
ab
ab
ba =+= ψκ . 
It will be assumed that κ≥1, implying that a 1% rise in the money supply raises 
ominal GDP by no more than 1% in the short run. In the special case in which demand is 
determ
 
 
n
ined from a constant velocity specification, (15) can be expressed as ttt YMP ˆˆ
ˆ −= , 
implying that κ=1 and ψ=0.  
Given these assumptions about wage expectations and demand, Appendix B derives 
the following equation for wages: 
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We first consider shocks to demand. Suppose that there is a one-time permanent 
shock to nominal demand such that  for t≤0 and  for t≥1. The path of 
(17) . 
 
 
 
0ˆ =tM MM t ˆˆ Δ=
wages over time is  
 
t
 
MW t ˆ)1(ˆ Δ−= μ
 18
In addition, substituting
 into (B1) yields the following expression for output: 
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hort run. However, 
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same percentage amount as the shock, and output eventually returns to its initial level.  
 The real wage is described by the equation, 
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he model’s parameters, the term in the large square brackets can be sitive, 
ero, or negative, which means that real wages can be procyclical, acyclical, or 
cal real wages, while most empirical 
evidenc
eal demand raise wages, output, 
and pri
ements 
 
Depending on t  po
z
countercyclical.13 The prediction that real wages can be either procyclical or countercyclical 
is consistent with evidence that real wages appear to be procyclical in some periods and 
countercyclical in other periods. For example, Huang, Liu, and Phaneuf (2004) review 
previous studies that find that real wages were countercyclical in the interwar period but 
have been procyclical since the end of World War II.  
As previously discussed, a criticism of models in which wages are rigid but prices 
are flexible is that these models predict countercycli
e suggest that they have been procyclical in recent decades. In the present study the 
source of nominal stickiness is the slow adjustment of nominal wages. Nominal wages 
adjust slowly because of the assumptions of efficiency wages and partly adaptive 
expectations. On the other hand, there is no impediment to price adjustment, other than the 
slow adjustment of nominal wages. Given nominal wages, firms set prices at their optimal 
level in each period. Thus, it is demonstrated that real wages can be procyclical in a model 
in which prices are flexible but nominal wages are sticky.  
Shocks to real demand (E) can be analyzed in a similar manner as shocks to nominal 
demand. From equations (14), (B1), and (15), shocks to r
ces by ψ times the amount that nominal demand shocks raise these variables.  
We now consider shocks to technology (A) and shocks to input prices (z). These 
shocks are likely to also affect autonomous expenditures (E). Technological improv
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are likely to increase investment and permanent income, leading to an increase in E. On the 
other hand, increases in oil prices may reduce the consumption of domestic goods by 
reducing permanent income and by raising consumption of foreign imports at the expense of 
domestic goods. Input price increases may also reduce investment if investment and the 
input are complements.  
Suppose there is a one-time permanent shock to technology of the amount AˆΔ . 
Suppose also that this shock to technology affects autonomous expenditures by the am
ν, so th
(
ount 
at AE ˆˆ Δ=Δ ν . Then from (14) the path of wages is  
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-run effect of this technology shock is to raise output by 
 
The long )1/( βφ − . Whether 
utput rises by more or less than this amount in the short run depends on the value of o
ψνβκφ +−  With reasonable parameter values, the overall eff  to cause 
output to temporarily rise above potential output. Cover, Enders, and Hueng (2006) estimate 
rve 0.64% to the right, implying that ν=0.64. 
Mankiw and Summers (1986) estimate that the quantity elasticity of money demand and the 
interest elasticity of money demand approximately equal 1.0 and -0.1, respectively. These 
values imply that b1=1 and b2=0.1. They also report estimates from Friedman (1978) that the 
interest elasticity of spending is 0.17. In addition, Ramey (2008) estimates that the multiplier 
is 1.4. Friedman’s and Ramey’s estimates imply that a1=1.4 and a2=0.24. Taken together, 
these estimates yield κ=1.42 and ψ=0.59. If it is assumed that φ=0.7 and β=0.02 (implying 
that a doubling of input prices reduces output by 2%), then 
− )]1/()1([ .
that a 1% supply shock shifts the AD cu
ect will be
ψνβκφ +−− )]1/()1([ =0.078, 
which means that a positive technology shock raises short-run output more than it raises 
long-run output and that unemployment initially falls below the natural rate. 
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The long-run response of prices to this technology shock depends on the value of 
)1/()( βκφνψ −− . With the above parameter values, this expression equals -0.64, which 
means 
μt-1 is negative, im
Substituting this value for 
that positive technology shocks reduce the price level. In addition, the coefficient on 
plying that the price level falls more in the short run than in the long run. 
In the long run, this technology shock raises real wages by Aˆ)]1/([ Δ− βφ . 
tt PW
ˆˆ − ˆΔ into (13) shows that a technology shock of  
an eventual rise in output of .  
ich dem
A  results in
Aˆ)]1/([ Δ− βφ
In the special case in wh and is described by a constant velocity specification 
(i.e., ttt PYM
ˆˆˆ −= ), κ=1 and ψ=0. Under these conditions, technology shocks do not affect 
wages, since nom
κ=1 and ψ
inal demand is the only exogenous variable that affects wages in equation 
(14) if =0. Also, the assumption that 1ˆ)1(ˆ
ˆ −+=e WWW ωω  means that supply 
shocks do not affect expected wages either. Equation (B3) shows that employment (and thus 
unemployment) is not affected by technology sh er these conditions, 
technology shocks shift the short-run and long-run AS curves by the same amount and do 
not affect the AD curve. Accordingly, output rises to its new potential value following a 
technology shock and remains there.  
The effects of input price shocks are proportional to the effects to productivity 
shocks, but in the opposite direction. U
−ttt
ocks in this case. Und
nder reasonable parameter values, adverse input price 
shocks cause output to initially fall below the new (and lower) value of potential GDP and 
unemployment to initially rise above the natural rate, before returning to the natural rate. In 
addition, these shocks cause the price level to rise, with the price level rising more in the 
short run than in the long run. These predictions appear to be consistent with empirical 
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evidence. Following large increases in oil prices in 1973-74 and 1979-80, both 
unemployment and inflation initially rose and then decreased.  
In this section it is assumed that workers’ expectations of average wages are a 
weighted average of rational and adaptive expectations. The preceding analysis considers a 
specification in which the adaptive component of workers’ expectations is the lagged 
average wage. However, in an economy that has historically experienced wage growth, it 
may be more reasonable to assume that the adaptive expectations component equals last 
period’s wage adjusted by past wage inflation. In this case, workers’ expectations of average 
wages can be expressed as 
 
 
ω
ω
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1
2
1
t
t
W
W
. 
With this specification for workers’ expectations, the wage equation is a second-order 
difference equation. In this case it can be demonstrated that disinflationary aggregate 
V. Inflation Variability and the Slope of the AS Curve 
Lucas (1973) finds that nominal demand shocks have smaller effects on real output 
(i.e., the AS curv His explanation 
for the
ves a model of workers’ expectations of 
demand shocks temporarily reduce output and that wage and price inflation exhibit inertia.14  
 
 
e is steeper) in countries with higher inflation variability. 
 negative relationship between the slope of the AS curve and the variability of 
inflation is that firms in countries with highly variable inflation tend to view changes in their 
own price as more reflective of overall price changes and less reflective of relative price 
changes, resulting in smaller adjustments in output. 
The efficiency wage – imperfect information model provides an alternative 
interpretation of this finding. Campbell (2009b) deri
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average wages from utility-maximizing behavior. It is demonstrated that their expectations 
of average wages can be expressed as a weighted average of rational and adaptive 
expectations, with the weights depending on the cost of obtaining information about current 
average wages and on the historical accuracy of adaptive expectations. In particular, the 
degree to which expectations are rational (represented by a higher value of ω in the present 
study) depends positively on the forecast error of adaptive expectations. It is likely that 
adaptive expectations will predict wages less accurately in countries with higher inflation 
variability, resulting in a higher value of ω in these countries. As demonstrated below, the 
degree to which nominal demand shocks affect real output depends negatively on ω. 
The coefficient on ΔM in the equation for Yˆ  (equation 16) can be expressed as Cμt-1, 
where  
t
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Since C depend negatively on ω, a rise in ω lowers the degree to which nominal 
demand shocks affect real output at any value of t.  As nominal demand shocks have a 
maller effect on output, they have a greater effect on prices (from (15)), which means that a 
ends on the ratio between 
pectations of average wages. More generally it could be assumed 
that their efficiency depe r reference wage ( ), 
so that  
variable with which workers compare their 
current age in making decisions that affect their efficiency (e.g., deciding how hard to 
work or how much time to devote to job search, which affects their quit propensities.) An 
importa
μ and 
s
rise in ω is associated with a steeper aggregate supply curve.  
 
VI. A Generalized Version of the Model 
In Section III it is assumed that workers’ efficiency dep
their wages and their ex
nds on the ratio between their wage and thei RtW
 
 ],/[ t
R
tt uWWee = . 
 
The reference wage can be viewed as any 
 w
nt determinant of the reference wage is workers’ expectations of the average wage, 
as assumed in Section III. However, the reference wage may also depend on workers’ 
perception of their fair wage.15 Determinants of a worker’s perceived fair wage may include 
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the worker’s past wage or past wage increases. For example, if a worker has received 4% 
wage increases for the past several years, he or she may view the fair wage as last period’s 
wage plus a 4% increase. Suppose that a worker’s reference wage is the maximum of last 
period’s wage, last period’s wage adjusted by recent wage increases, and the worker’s 
expectations of average wages. Then the reference wage can be expressed as 
 
]),%1(,[Max 111 ttttt −−−
 
Such a model can explain why wages generally increase in reces
eR WWWWW Δ+= . 
sions, even if 
workers have rational expectations about average wages. Since efficiency may depend on a 
worker’s wage relative to what he or she would earn if given the same wage increase as in 
recent 
VII. Conclusion 
This study develops an efficiency wage – imperfect information model of the 
aggregate supply curve from a model in which firms maximize profits and output is 
determined from a production funct  an input. The profit-maximization 
problem
years, firms may have an incentive to continue to grant wage increases when 
unemployment is high. In addition, since last period’s wage may be a determinant of the 
reference wage, firms may be reluctant to reduce nominal wages, even in times when 
workers know that economic conditions are poor. Thus, this model can explain why nominal 
wages may exhibit downward rigidity, and hence why negative aggregate demand shocks 
may cause economic downturns. 
 
 
ion with labor as
 of firms yields a reduced-form equation for aggregate supply as a function of 
technology, input prices, capital, wages, expected wages, and the price level. Under 
 27
reasonable assumptions, the coefficient on the price level is positive, so that the aggregate 
supply curve is upward sloping.  
If specific assumptions are made about workers’ expectations of average wages and 
about aggregate demand, the model predicts how the aggregate demand and supply curves 
shift an
ountries with greater inflation variability. In counties 
with g
age, where the reference wage may depend on 
d how output and prices adjust in response to demand shocks and supply shocks. In 
response to aggregate demand shocks, wages and prices adjust slowly to their new 
equilibrium values, and output initially rises. However, output approaches potential GDP as 
wages and prices adjust to their new steady-state values. When the economy experiences a 
technology shock or input price shock, the short-run and long-run AS curves both shift. In 
addition, supply shocks may shift the AD curve through their effect on real expenditures. 
With reasonable parameters, positive supply shocks cause output to initially rise above the 
new (and higher) value of potential GDP, so that unemployment initially falls below the 
natural rate. In addition, positive supply shocks cause the price level to decrease, with the 
short-run decrease exceeding the long-run decrease. Adverse supply shocks have the 
opposite effect on output and prices.  
The model also provides another explanation for Lucas’ (1973) finding that the 
aggregate supply curve is steeper in c
reater inflation variability, workers have a greater incentive to acquire information 
about average wages, so that their expectations of average wages are likely to be more 
rational and less adaptive. The model predicts that the aggregate supply curve steepens as 
wage expectations become more rational. 
The model can be generalized to make efficiency a function of the ratio between a 
worker’s wage and his or her reference w
 28
workers’ perception of their fair wage, as well as on their expectations of average wages. 
This generalized model may explain why wages often continue to rise in recessionary 
periods and why nominal wages may exhibit downwards rigidity.  
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Appendix A 
 
Derivation of equation (2): 
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Derivation of equation (12): 
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Using the relationship tt Y=θ  yields 
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Appendix B 
 
Equation (12) can be expressed as  
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In addition, the labor demand curve (equation 10) can now be expressed as 
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Substituting (B1) into (B2) yields 
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We then totally differentiate (6) and divide by the original equation, yielding  
 
 
.
ˆ1ˆ10
1
11
tu
W
Wu
e
te
t
t
W
WW
e
t
t
Wte
t
t
W
WW
e
t
t
W
duee
e
e
W
W
W
e
e
W
WeeW
W
W
e
e
W
Wee
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−=
−
−−
  
 
 
Since t
e
t WW =  in equilibrium and 1)/( −= Wett eeWW  (from equation 7), the above equation 
can be approximated by  
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Then the above equation can be expressed as, 
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Since λ<0 and β<1, 0<μ<1. The solution to the difference equation yields 
 35
.ˆ
1
)1(ˆ
1
)1(
ˆ
1
1ˆ
1
1ˆ
1
)1(ˆ
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
∑∑
∑∑∑
−
=
−
−
=
−
−
=
−
−
=
−
−
=
−
−+
−−−+
−−
−+
−−−+
−+−+
−=
t
j
jt
j
t
j
jt
j
t
j
jt
j
t
j
jt
j
t
j
jt
j
t
zE
MKAW
μβλ
κβμβλ
βψ
μβλ
βμβλ
κμβλ
κφ
  
 
 36
  
References 
 
Akerlof, George A. and Janet L. Yellen, “The Fair Wage – Effort Hypothesis and 
Unemployment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1990, 105, 255-283. 
 
Baily, Martin Neil, Eric J. Bartelsman, and John Haltiwanger, “Labor Productivity: 
Structural Change and Cyclical Dyanamics,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 
August 2001, 83, 420-433.  
 
Ball, Laurence, “Credible Disinflation with Staggered Price-Setting,” American Economic 
Review, March 1994, 84, 282-289. 
 
Ball, Laurence, N. Gregory Mankiw, and David Romer, “ The New Keynesian Economics 
and the Output-Inflation Trade-Off,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1988:1, 
1-65. 
 
Bewley, Truman F., Why Wages Don’t Fall During a Recession, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999. 
 
Bils, Mark J., “Real Wages over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Panel Data,” Journal of 
Political Economy, August 1985, 93, 666-689. 
 
Blanchard, Olivier, Macroeconomics, Third Edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
2003. 
 
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Danny Quah, “The Dynamic Effects of Aggregate Demand and 
Supply Disturbances,” American Economic Review, September 1989, 79, 655-673. 
 
Calvo, Guillermo A., “Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework,” Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 12, September 1983, 383-398. 
 
Caplin, Andrew S. and Daniel F. Spulber, “Menu Costs and the Neutrality of Money,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1987, 102, 703-725.  
 
Campbell, Carl M., “A Model of the Determinants of Effort,” Economic Modelling, March 
2006, 23, 215-237.  
 
________, “An Efficiency Wage Approach to Reconciling the Wage Curve and the Phillips 
Curve,” Labour Economics, December 2008, 15, 1388-1415.  
 
________, (2009a) “An Efficiency Wage – Imperfect Information Model of the Phillips 
Curve,” Working Paper, Northern Illinois University, May 2009.  
 
________, (2009b) “The Formation of Wage Expectations in the Effort and Quit Decisions 
of Workers,” Working Paper, Northern Illinois University, March 2009. 
 37
Cover, James Perry; Walter Enders, and C. James Hueng, “Using the Aggregate Demand-
Aggregate Supply Model to Identify Structural Demand-Side and Supply-Side Shocks: 
Results Using a Bivariate VAR,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, April 2006, 
38, 777-790.  
 
Friedman, Benjamin M., “Crowding Out or Crowding In? Economic Consequences of 
Financing Government Deficits,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1978:3, 
593-641.  
 
Gamber, Edward N., “Empirical Estimates of the Short-Run Aggregate Supply and Demand 
Curves for the Post-War U.S. Economy,” Southern Economic Journal, April 1996, 62, 
856-872.  
 
Huang, Kevin X. D., Zheng Liu, and Louis Phaneuf, “Why Does the Cyclical Behavior of 
Real Wages Change Over Time?” American Economic Review, September 2004, 94, 
836-856.  
 
Keynes, John Maynard, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, London: 
Macmillan, 1936.  
 
Lucas, Robert E., “Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs,” American 
Economic Review, June 1973, 63, 326-334. 
 
Mankiw, N. Gregory, Macroeconomics, Sixth Edition, New York: Worth Publishers, 2007. 
 
Mankiw, N. Gregory and Ricardo Reis, “Sticky Information Versus Sticky Prices: A 
Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, November 2002, 117, 1295-1328. 
  
Mankiw, N. Gregory, and Lawrence H. Summers, “Money Demand and the Effects of Fiscal 
Policies,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, November 1986, 18, 415-429. 
 
Roberts, John M., “New Keynesian Economics and the Phillips Curve,” Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking, November 1995, 27, 975-984.  
 
Romer, David, Advanced Macroeconomics, Third Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 
2006.  
 
Rotemberg, Julio J., “Monopolistic Price Adjustment and Aggregate Output,” Review of 
Economic Studies, October 1982, 49, 517-531. 
 
Solon, Gary, Robert Barsky, and Jonathan A. Parker, “Measuring the Cyclicality of Real 
Wages: How Important Is Composition Bias?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
February 1994, 109, 1-25.  
 
 38
Taylor, John B., “Staggered Wage Setting in a Macro Model,” American Economic 
Review,May 1979, 69, 108-113. 
 39
                                                          
  
Footnotes 
 
D
tt Y=θ
1 However, as discussed in Romer (2006), the short-run aggregate supply curve is horizontal in the Keynesian 
model with fixed prices. 
2 These issues are discussed in Mankiw and Reis (2002). 
3 In the other version of Rotemberg’s model, other goods are the inputs in the production function. 
4 In terms of a worker’s quit decision, imperfect information about average wages would not be likely to affect 
his or her decision about whether to accept a given outside job offer. However, it may affect the worker’s 
motivation to search for another job. For example, a worker who believes he or she is paid less than the 
average wage (even if this belief is incorrect) will spend more time searching for another job, and ceteris 
paribus, will be more likely to receive a favorable job offer from another firm.  
5 While this study uses a representative worker and firm framework for simplicity, this assumption is obviously 
an abstraction. In reality, workers are heterogeneous, and the relevant comparison is the average wage for 
workers in similar occupations who have similar characteristics.  
6 The cost to firms of forming incorrect expectations about the overall price level is lower profits. The cost to 
workers of forming incorrect expectations about average wages is exerting a suboptimal amount of effort 
and/or engaging in a suboptimal amount of job search. 
7 Justification for the assumption that eWu<0 is discussed in Campbell (2008). 
8 If all firms paid the same wage, workers could infer the average wage from their own wage. Thus, for 
forming wage expectations to be a non-trivial exercise, it is necessary that wages vary across firms. For 
example, it could be assumed that firms make random errors in setting wages, but that the profit-maximizing 
wage is set on average. These errors may result from firms’ lacking perfect information about the level of 
product demand or about the parameters in their profit functions. 
9 As discussed in Campbell (2008), assuming a positive relationship between efficiency and wages does not 
guarantee that there will be excess supply of labor. Whether a firm operates on its labor supply curve or to the 
left of its labor supply curve (i.e., pays an efficiency wage) depends on the elasticity of output with respect to 
the wage, calculated at the market-clearing wage.  
10 The relationship is obtained from the fact that γθ −= )/( tttDt PPY and that tt PP =
t
D
t YY =
 in a 
representative firm model. The relationship  is a consequence of market clearing.  
11 As previously discussed, wages must vary across firms if forming wage expectations is to be a non-trivial 
exercise. To incorporate wage variation into the model, it could be assumed that the condition for an individual 
firm is it
1 1 )/1](,/[],/[ ε+=− ettetitWtetitit WuWWeuWWeW , where the εit’s sum to 0 for the aggregate 
economy in each time period. In this case, wages will vary across firms, but equation (6) will hold for the 
aggregate economy.  
12 If expansionary demand shocks initially raise real wages, the last term in (13) will be negative. However, 
under reasonable conditions the second-to-last term in (13) will rise more than the last term falls, so the overall 
effect will be to raise output. 
13 The fact that real wages can be either procyclical or countercyclical under reasonable conditions can be 
illustrated by calculating the relationship between unemployment and real wages with realistic parameter 
values. Values for for e, eu, eWW,  eWu, and sL are taken from Campbell (2008).  Campbell (2008) considers two 
specifications for workers’ efficiency: a micro-based efficiency function and a naïve efficiency function. These 
efficiency functions yield different values for eWW,  and eWu. A demand shock that lowers the unemployment 
rate by 1 percentage-point raises real wages by 0.44% with the naïve efficiency function and lowers real wages 
by 0.008% with the micro-based efficiency function. With a constant velocity specification (so that κ=1), a 1 
percentage-point decrease in unemployment is still associated with a 0.44% rise in real wages with the naïve 
efficiency function and a 0.008 decrease in real wages with the micro-based efficiency function.  
14 See Campbell (2009a) for a model of the Phillips curve in which workers’ wage expectations depend on the 
past growth rate of average wages. In response to a deceleration in the growth rate of demand, this model 
demonstrates that unemployment rises and that wage and price inflation exhibit persistence.  
15 See Akerlof and Yellen (1990) for a discussion of the fair wage-effort hypothesis. 
